Book Review of, Nietzsche: Ethics of an Immoralist by Hill, R. Kevin
Portland State University
PDXScholar
Philosophy Faculty Publications and Presentations Philosophy
4-1996
Book Review of, Nietzsche: Ethics of an Immoralist
R. Kevin Hill
Portland State University, hillrk@pdx.edu
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/phl_fac
Part of the Other Philosophy Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Publications and Presentations by
an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu.
Citation Details
Hill, R. (1996, April). Peter Berkowitz, Nietzsche: Ethics of an Immoralist, Harvard University Press, 1995, Ethics, 106, 659-661.
Book Reviews 659 
An advantage of the pragmatic argument is that it does not rely on a dubious 
model of how rational agents would perform under ideal conditions, but it 
settles for a model that starts from where we are now and tries to establish 
what is [in McCarthy's words] 'practically indispensable'" (pp. 266-67). 
Hoy, in other words, thinks that you can continue to make good use of 
Enlightenment ideals even after you drop the Kantian attempt to build them 
into the fabric of something transhistorical. As a good pragmatist, he grants 
the need for foci imaginarii but questions the need for a transcendental justifi-
cation or explanation of them. The "hermeneutic model" of communication 
and argumentation which Hoy advocates "does not hold belief hostage to a 
future that can never be present. It insists, instead, that beliefs are checked 
only against other actual beliefs, not against some ideal panel of judges" 
(p.269). 
Since I am a die-hard pragmatist, I cannot even pretend to offer impartial 
ajudication of the Hoy-McCarthy debate. So I shall confine myself to two 
remarks. The first is that this is a very useful book to assign when teaching 
courses in contemporary European philosophy or in sociopolitical philosophy. 
My students like it a lot. I found that assigning just a little Foucault and a 
little Habermas plus the Hoy-McCarthy book led to a better understanding 
of the issues than assigning lots of Foucault and lots of Habermas. 
The second remark is that if one prescinds from Foucault's antihumanism, 
as Hoy does when he amalgamates Foucault with the deeply humanist Ga-
darner, then the remaining differences between Foucault and Habermas seem 
to make very little difference. One reaction my students had to the Hoy-
McCarthy book was to ask whether the presence or absence of adjectives like 
'unconditional', 'necessary', and 'universal' before the noun 'truth' was an issue 
worth debating. 
Berkowitz, Peter. Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist. 
RICHARD RORTY 
University of Virginia 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995. pp. 313. $35.00 (cloth). 
Poststructuralists picture Nietzsche advocating the free play of texts and an 
ethical aestheticism without standards or limits. Peter Berkowitz, in his broadly 
neo-Straussian interpretation Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist, rightly de-
plores the occlusion of Nietzsche's elitism. Few philosophers since Plato have 
been so preoccupied with the nature of human excellence or so stingy in their 
attributions of it. To place this interest in excellence at the center of his 
thought, however, forces us to abandon the more anarchic Nietzsche beloved 
of his more recent readers. 
Berkowitz's project is articulated in two parts. First, he makes the case 
for Nietzsche's commitment to excellence by a careful look at Nietzsche's 
historical speculations in a section entitled "Nietzsche's Histories." Taking the 
early essay "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History" as programmatic, 
Berkowitz reads three of Nietzsche's books as executing the program of con-
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structing histories useful to life. This half of the book is masterfully executed 
and will repay close reading and rereading. 
However, Berkowitz also wishes to do justice to the "anarchy." In the 
wake of the death of God, "the general rejection of a natural, rational or 
revealed order independent of human will" (p. 270), we are left with no basis 
for making the very distinctions between noble and base upon which 
Nietzsche's critical project depends. This objection, and Berkowitz's related 
suggestion that perhaps God is not dead after all, underscores two flaws in 
his reading. First, the death of God for Nietzsche should be understood as 
the cultural collapse of a supernatural justification for specifically Christian 
values. Nietzsche subsequently argued that secular justifications for the same 
set of values cannot survive scrutiny. By characterizing the death of God as a 
metaethical claim of boundless application, Berkowitz sets the bar too high 
for Nietzsche or, indeed, for anyone. This, in turn, prevents him from seeing 
the crucial role of power (creativity, independence, self-mastery) as the human 
telos. Nietzsche is not claiming that, lacking any telos, we might as well become 
powerful but that our telos is to become powerful. Such a view is open to 
numerous objections, to be sure, but not the objection that Nietzsche has not 
provided any metaphysical foundation for the standards to which he appeals. 
Not only does Berkowitz object that Nietzsche's appeal to standards of 
excellence is unjustified; he claims that it is excessively demanding. Lacking 
God, we must make ourselves into gods-but this is something no human 
being can do. Berkowitz's central objection to this demand is not that it is 
unattainable (after all, social justice, world peace, and countless other uncon-
troversial desiderata are also unattainable). Rather, it sets people a task that 
removes them from the community altogether and, in this sense, is politically 
nihilistic. Plato at least required his philosophers to return to the cave, but 
Nietzsche's higher types, as solely and intrinsically valuable, seem to leave the 
cave never to be heard from again. This is an objection with which 1 have 
some sympathy. However, we must ask whether it is so unusual a view for 
Nietzsche to hold. One could find not a few classical liberals who hold similar, 
although more tepidly expressed, views. 
Berkowitz interprets the will to power as sheer self-assertion (so to speak, 
what is left ofliberal notions ofthe self when law and reason are removed). This 
leads to a confused understanding of the eternal recurrence as the attempt to 
master the cosmos despite the incoherence of striving to master anything in 
a deterministic world. Nietzsche's commitment to determinism and his critique 
of the notion of free will on both metaphysical and ethical grounds is a remark-
ably stable part of Nietzsche's evolving view, early, middle, and late. Again, 
insufficient attention to the notion of will to power leads Berkowitz to miss 
how Nietzsche reconceived the entire issue of free will as one of activity versus 
reactivity within a deterministic cosmos. What is at issue in the notion of the 
eternal recurrence is not the mastery of the world. It is affirmation, love of 
the world as it is, that Nietzsche believes we must achieve if we are to fully 
overcome nihilism. 
Berkowitz's interpretation here crucially depends upon his interpretation 
of Zarathustra. As in Laurence Lampert's Nietzsche's Teaching, Berkowitz goes 
beyond simply citing Zarathustra's speeches as sources for Nietzsche's views 
and instead includes consideration of plot, character, symbolism, and other 
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literary elements of the text to arrive at a richer reading. Although this tech-
nique bears considerable fruit in Lampert's work, Berkowitz's reading proves 
to be far too speculative to support the kinds of criticisms of Nietzsche's 
thought he wishes it to bear. For example, do we have good reason to believe 
that Zarathustra's greater age at the beginning of part 4 is symbolic of his 
deterioration in the wake of sacrificing his intellectual integrity by affirming 
the eternal recurrence in part 3? Nietzsche did not regard the eternal recur-
rence as demanding such a sacrifice. In short, too much of Berkowitz's case 
rests on ad hominem arguments against a fictional character, and the specific 
complaints about the character are themselves far too speculative to take 
seriously. 
The book concludes with an exegesis of Beyand Good and Evil, where the 
author shows how for Nietzsche the practice of philosophy itself is the highest 
expression of his conception of excellence. Here, the virtues of the earlier 
half return, and although Berkowitz continues to draw the same critical conclu-
sions, his interpretation is insightful and repays close attention. 
In the end, Berkowitz rejects Nietzsche's thought for being insufficiently 
justified, inhumane, and excessively demanding. One could say the same about 
Plato. Although Berkowitz has not done justice to what justification Nietzsche 
offers, this book will stand as a needed corrective to common misconceptions 
about Nietzsche's ethics and the beginning of what should prove to be a 
fruitful debate over its grounds and implications. 
R. KEVIN HILL 
Northwestern University 
Gutting, Gary, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Foucault. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. xii+360. $59.95 (cloth); 
$17.95 (paper). 
The Cambridge Companion series has as its goal to offer overviews of the major 
themes and concerns of important thinkers in the Western philosophical tradi-
tion. The Cambridge Companion to Foucault fulfills this task admirably and in 
addition presents several important new substantive perspectives on Foucault's 
works. This addition is unsurprising, since the authors of the various chapters 
include almost every major Foucaultian thinker outside of France. (The most 
important Foucaultian not included that comes to mind is John Rajchman.) 
I would like to proceed by highlighting various aspects of the book, along the 
way calling attention to several substantive new perspectives the book offers. 
The two requirements on a book of this nature are that it give both 
overview and treatments of specific themes and that it do so clearly. These 
requirements are particularly pressing in the case of Foucault, since most 
of his major philosophical points are embedded in specific historical anal-
yses. The Cambridge Companion to Foucault provides a balance of overview 
and specific analyses. Representing the former are Thomas Flynn's opening 
essay mapping the standard periodization of Foucault's works (archaeologi-
cal, genealogical, and ethical) and Jana Sawicki's discussion of Foucault's 
